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Abstract
A visible light communication broadcast channel is considered, in which a transmitter luminaire
communicates with two legitimate receivers in the presence of an external eavesdropper. A number
of trusted cooperative half-duplex relay luminaires are deployed to aid with securing the transmitted
data. Transmitters are equipped with single light fixtures, containing multiple light emitting diodes, and
receiving nodes are equipped with single photo-detectors, rendering the considered setting as a single-
input single-output system. Transmission is amplitude-constrained to maintain operation within the light
emitting diodes’ dynamic range. Achievable secrecy rate regions are derived under such amplitude
constraints for this multi-receiver wiretap channel, first for direct transmission without the relays, and
then for multiple relaying schemes: cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward.
Superposition coding with uniform signaling is used at the transmitter and the relays. Further, for each
relaying scheme, secure beamforming vectors are carefully designed at the relay nodes in order to hurt
the eavesdropper and/or benefit the legitimate receivers. Superiority of the proposed relaying schemes,
with secure beamforming, is shown over direct transmission. It is also shown that the best relaying
scheme depends on how far the eavesdropper is located from the transmitter and the relays, the number
of relays, and their geometric layout.
I. INTRODUCTION
Visible light communications (VLC) technology is a promising candidate for future high-speed
indoor communication systems, offering solutions to spectrum congestion issues in conventional
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2radio frequency (RF) systems [1], [2]. The broadcast property in VLC, however, calls for
careful design of secure communications to protect legitimate users from potential eavesdroppers,
especially in public areas. Physical layer security is a powerful technique to deliver provably
secure data for wireless systems through jointly encoding for reliability and security, see, e.g.,
[3]. In this work, we design physical layer secure relaying schemes for a broadcast VLC channel
with an external eavesdropper.
Recently, there have been several works on physical layer security aspects in VLC, see, e.g.,
[4]–[22]. The idea of employing an external friendly node that transmits jamming signals to
degrade the eavesdropper channel is investigated in [4], [5], under amplitude constraints that are
imposed such that the light emitting diodes (LEDs) operate within their dynamic range, with
[4] focusing on uniform signaling and [5] focusing on truncated Gaussian signaling. Achievable
secrecy rates for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) VLC channel are derived in [6], which
are then used for transmit beamforming signal design for the MISO setting in [7]. References
[8], [9] also derive achievable secrecy rates for the MISO VLC channel and design transmit
beamforming signals, yet with a focus on truncated generalized normal signaling, showing
improvement over rates achieved by both uniform and truncated Gaussian signaling. Further
improvements are later shown in [10] by using discrete signaling with finite number of mass
points. Discrete signaling is also considered in [11], in which closed-form achievable secrecy
rates for single-input single-output (SISO) VLC channels are derived. Reference [12] considers
a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) VLC channel and derives achievable secrecy rates via
designing transmit covariance matrices for uncorrelated symmetric logarithmic-concave input
distributions. Secrecy outage probabilities are derived in [13]–[15] with multiple eavesdroppers,
via tools from stochastic geometry and spatial point processes. Security aspects of hybrid
VLC/RF setups are considered in [16], [17]. A multiple-transmitter and multiple-eavesdropper
scenario with one legitimate user is considered in [18], in which secrecy outage probabilities
and ergodic secrecy rates with and without transmitters’ cooperation are derived. Beamforming
design techniques are proposed in [19] to provide security in cases where the locations of
eavesdroppers are only statistically known. The impacts of how multipath light reflections can
jeoperdize security is studied in [20]. References [21], [22] are the most closely related to our
work, in which broadcast VLC channels with confidential messages are considered and achievable
3secrecy sum rates are derived.
Motivated by their ability to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and overall performance
of optical wireless communication systems, relaying luminaires have been studied in [23]–[30]
under various settings and assumptions, yet with no external eavesdroppers. Reference [23]
studies amplify-and-forward and decode-and-forward relaying schemes, and shows that multi-
hop diversity gains can be provided at the destination. Both relaying schemes are also studied
in [24] to enhance achievable rates of mobile users. References [25], [26] consider multiple
relaying scenarios where ceiling lights arranged in linear and triangular topologies help each
other through multi-hop transmission. Several multiple relay-assisted VLC systems are proposed
in [27], where it is shown that multi gigabit-per-second rates can be realized with simple optical
modulation formats. In [28], an LED light bulb in a desk lamp is used as a relay for an OFDM-
based VLC system. In [29], a cooperative VLC system is investigated in which an intermediate
light source acts as a relay terminal operating in full duplex mode. Outage probability analysis
is carried out in [30] under different relaying schemes in a hybrid VLC/RF setup.
Inspired by the above works, in this paper we investigate the role of using extra luminary
sources acting as trusted cooperative half-duplex relays in securing a two-user broadcast VLC
channel from an external eavesdropper. In our setting, an amplitude constraint is imposed upon
the transmitted signal in order for the LEDs to operate within their dynamic range. Under such
amplitude constraint, we first derive an achievable secrecy rate region, without using the relays,
based on superposition coding with uniform signaling at the source. We then invoke the relays,
and derive achievable secrecy rate regions for several relaying schemes: cooperative jamming,
decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward, in all of which an amplitude constraint also
applies to the relays’ transmissions. For each relaying scheme, we design secure beamforming
signals to maximize the achievable rates under the relays’ amplitude constraints. The design
of the beamforming signals is based on formulating optimization problems that are inferred
from the derived achievable secrecy rates. Results show the enhancement, in general, of the
achievable secrecy rates using the relays, and that the best relaying scheme highly depends on
the eavesdropper’s distance from the transmitter and the relays, and also on the number of relays
and how they are geometrically laid out.
We note that while the methodologies involved in this work have been previously introduced
4for RF communications, there exists some differences that need to be carefully considered when
employing them in the context of VLC. First, and as mentioned above, a physical amplitude
constraint applies to all transmitted signals from the LEDs. Invoking amplitude constraints calls
for new transmission signaling design. For instance, Gaussian signaling, which is optimal for
additive white Gaussian noise channels with average power constraints, is not even feasible
here. We work with uniform signaling, as done in some works in the VLC literature, e.g.,
[4], [6], [7], and derive achievable secrecy rate regions based on superposition coding using
information-theoretic tools. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that achievable
information-theoretic secrecy rate regions are derived under amplitude constraints for multiuser
VLC with cooperative relays. Our analysis yields closed-form expressions that enable optimal
design of the relay beamforming vectors using linear-algebraic and optimization tools, which are
shown to boost the achievable secrecy rate regions in general. Second, the VLC channel model
is also different from conventional RF channel models; the indoor line-of-sight model used is
largely deterministic, and strongly related to the Euclidian distance of the transmission link. The
channel gain is real-valued, positive, and depends mainly on the relative locations between the
nodes, in addition to some physical characteristics of the illuminating LEDs.
It is worth mentioning that sending information simultaneously to multiple users over the
same resource block using superposition coding is commonly referred to, in the wireless com-
munications literature, by non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) [31], [32]. Our approach can
then be viewed as providing security at the physical layer using cooperative relays in a VLC
channel in which NOMA techniques are employed.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an indoor VLC channel in which a transmitter (source) communicates with two
legitimate receivers (users) in the presence of an external eavesdropper. The source is mounted
on the ceiling, and is equipped with one light fixture that contains multiple LEDs modulated
by the same electric current signal. The two users, and the eavesdropper, are assumed to lie
geometrically on a two-dimensional plane close to the floor, and are each equipped with a single
photo detector (PD).
The source’s LEDs are driven by a fixed, positive bias electric current that sets the illumi-
nation intensity. The data signal, x ∈ R
5instantaneous optical power emitted from the LEDs. The source employs superposition coding
[33] to transmit two messages x1 and x2 to the first and the second user, respectively, by setting
x = αx1 + (1− α)x2 (1)
for some α ∈ [0, 1] that determines the priority of each user. In VLC, since the signal is modulated
onto the intensity of the emitted light, it must satisfy amplitude (or equivalently peak power)
constraints that are imposed by the dynamic range of typical LEDs to maintain linear current-
light conversion and avoid clipping distortion. An amplitude constraint, A > 0, is enforced as
follows:
α|x1|+ (1− α)|x2| ≤ A a.s. (2)
The VLC channel gain between the transmitting LEDs of a light fixture and a PD is given by
[34]
Adet(m+ 1)
2πl2
(
|zdiff |
l
)m+1
, (3)
where Adet ie the PD’s physical area in squared meters, m = − log(2)/ log
(
cosφ 1
2
)
is the order
of Lambertian emission, with φ 1
2
denoting the LED semi-angle at half power, l denoting the
distance between the LEDs and the PD, and zdiff denoting the vertical distance between them.
Note the VLC channel gain in the above model is positive and real-valued.
Let h1, h2, and he denote the channel gains between the source and the first user, second user,
and eavesdropper, respectively. Without loss of generality, let h1 > h2, and hence the first user
decodes the second user’s message first then uses successive interference cancellation to decode
its own message, while the second user decodes its message by treating the first user’s interfering
signal as noise [33]. From this point on, we denote the first user and the second user as the
strong user and the weak user, respectively. We denote by y1, y2, and ye the received signals, in
the electric domain, at the strong user, the weak user, and the eavesdropper, respectively. These
are
y1 =h1x+ n1, (4)
y2 =h2x+ n2, (5)
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Fig. 1. An indoor VLC system model in which a source luminaire communicates with two legitimate users in the presence of
an eavesdropper. A number of cooperative trusted relaying luminaires assist with the source’s transmission.
ye =hex+ ne, (6)
where n1, n2, and ne are i.i.d. ∼ N (0, 1) noise terms1.
A number of extra luminary sources acting as trusted cooperative half duplex relay nodes
are available to aid with securing data from the eavesdropper. Such relay nodes can be, e.g.,
mounted on the walls of the room in between the source and the users, or hanging from the
ceiling in between them, which is possibly deployable in buildings with multi-layered lighting
structures, see Fig. 1 and the schematic diagram in Fig. 2. Let there be K relays, and denote the
channel gains from the source to the relays by the vector2 hr , [hr,1, . . . , hr,K]. Let g1, g2, and
ge denote the K-length channel gain vectors from the relays to the strong user, the weak user,
and the eavesdropper, respectively. All channel gains: hj , j = 1, 2, e, hr and gj , j = 1, 2, e, are
assumed to be known at the source. On the other hand, the channel gains gj , j = 1, 2, e, are
assumed to be known at the relays.
Similar to the source, we assume an amplitude constraint, A¯ > 0, applies to the relays’
transmitted signal. In order to apply a fair comparison between the relaying and non-relaying
scenarios, we set A¯ = γA for some fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] to be designed. Operationally, we interpret
the amplitude constraint as a peak power constraint at the LEDs. Hence, in case of relaying,
the effective amplitude constraint that applies at the source’s LEDs reduces to Aγ ,
√
1− γ2A.
The fraction γ2 therefore divides the total system’s peak power budget A2 among the source
1We choose to normalize the noise variances in this paper for simplicity of presentation, and take that effect on the SNR into
the amplitude constraint’s value. That is, the SNR is now given by the square of the channel gain multiplied by the square of
the amplitude constraint.
2All vectors in this paper are column vectors.
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Fig. 2. A schematic diagram illustrating the considered VLC system model.
and the relays. This condition is to serve the purpose of avoiding situations in which one can
add relaying LEDs at no extra cost.
In the following sections, we derive achievable secrecy rates when the source and the relays
transmit their data using uniform signaling schemes. We first compute the rates without using
the relays, i.e., with γ = 0, and then compare them to the rates achieved under various
relaying strategies: cooperative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. For
these relaying schemes, we state the results for general γ ∈ [0, 1], and then discuss the optimal
design of γ in Section VII.
III. DIRECT TRANSMISSION
In this section, we derive an achievable secrecy rate region via direct transmission, i.e., without
using the relay nodes. We state the result in the following theorem, whose proof is in Appendix A:
Theorem 1 The following secrecy rate pair, for the strong and weak users, is achievable via
direct transmission for a given α:3
r1,s =
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
2h21α
2A2
πe
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
h2eα
2A2
3
)]+
, (7)
3The log terms in this paper denote natural logarithms, unless explicitly specifying otherwise.
8r2,s =
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
2h2
2
A2
pie
1 +
h2
2
α2A2
3
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 + h
2
eA
2
3
1 + 2h
2
eα
2A2
pie
)]+
, (8)
where the second subscript s is to denote secrecy rates, and [·]+ , max(·, 0).
Observe that for α = 1, we obtain r2,s = 0 since
2
pie
< 1
3
, and r1,s coincides with the SISO
achievable secrecy rate derived in [6], since the signal now is only directed toward one user (the
strong user). The opposite holds for α = 0 as well. It is also clear from (7) and (8) that the
strong user’s achievable secrecy rate is positive if and only if (iff)
2
πe
h21 >
1
3
h2e, (9)
and that the weak user’s achievable secrecy rate is positive iff
(
2
πe
−
α2
3
)
h22 +
(
2α2
πe
−
1
3
)
h2e >
(
1
9
−
4
π2e2
)
α2h22h
2
e. (10)
Thus, achieving positive secrecy rates depends on the relative channel conditions between the
users and the eavesdropper as articulated by the above inequalities. In the following sections,
we study how to enhance the achievable secrecy rates in Theorem 1 above by using cooperative
trusted relays.
IV. COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In this section, we discuss the cooperative jamming scheme. In such, the relays cooperatively
transmit a jamming signal Jz, simultaneously with the source’s transmission, to confuse the
eavesdropper. Here, J ∈ RK is a beamforming vector and z is a random variable that are both
to be designed under the following constraints:
|z| ≤A¯ a.s., (11)
‖J‖1 ≤1, (12)
where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the L1 norm operator: ‖J‖1 =
∑K
i=1 |Ji|. Observe that applying an L1
norm constraint has the operational meaning that the cooperative relaying LEDs share the peak
power budget A¯2 = γ2A2 allocated to them, whereas if an L∞ norm is used instead, i.e., if
we set: maxi Ji ≤ 1, then this would mean that each relay comes with its own power budget
9independently, i.e., the peak power budget A¯2 = γ2A2 would be given to each relay, which would
not be fair to compare with the non-relaying scenario. The received signals at the legitimate users
and the eavesdropper are now given by
y1 =h1x+ g
T
1 Jz + n1, (13)
y2 =h2x+ g
T
2 Jz + n2, (14)
ye =hex+ g
T
e Jz + ne, (15)
where the superscript T denotes the transpose operation, and the amplitude constraint on the
transmitted signal x is now reduced to Aγ =
√
1− γ2A.
In order not to harm the legitimate users, the beamforming vector is designed such that
gT1 J = g
T
2 J = 0, (16)
which is guaranteed if K ≥ 3 relays, making the matrix GT , [g1 g2]T have a non-empty null
space. Let us denote the beamforming vector satisfying (16) by Jo. We now have the following
result, whose proof is in Appendix B:
Theorem 2 The following secrecy rate pair, for the strong and weak users, is achievable via
cooperative jamming for a given α:
rJ1,s =

1
2
log
(
1 +
2h21α
2A2γ
πe
)
−
1
2
log

1 + h2eα2A2γ3 + (gTe Jo)
2
A¯2
3
1 + 2(g
T
e Jo)
2A¯2
pie




+
, (17)
rJ2,s =

1
2
log
(
1 +
2h2
2
A2γ
pie
1 +
h2
2
α2A2γ
3
)
−
1
2
log

 1 + h2eA2γ3 + (gTe Jo)
2
A¯2
3
1 +
2h2eα
2A2γ
pie
+ 2(g
T
e Jo)
2A¯2
pie




+
, (18)
where the superscript J is to denote the cooperative jamming scheme.
We now proceed to find the optimal beamforming vector Jo that maximally degrades the
eavesdropper’s channel. In view of (17) and (18), by direct first derivative analysis, one can
show that rJ1,s is increasing in
(
gTe Jo
)2
iff
h2eα
2A2γ >
πe
2
− 3 ≈ 1.27, (19)
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and that rJ2,s is increasing in
(
gTe Jo
)2
iff
h2e
(
1− α2
)
A2γ >
πe
2
− 3 ≈ 1.27. (20)
We note that, as a direct consequence of the data processing inequality [33], sending a jamming
signal can only degrade the eavesdropper’s channel. It is clear, however, that the inequalities in
(19) and (20) do not hold all the time, and hence sending a jamming signal might actually benefit
the eavesdropper. This is justified though, since we only derive lower bounds on the achievable
secrecy rates, as opposed to exact computations. Whenever the secrecy rate (of either user) is
increasing in
(
gTe Jo
)2
, we find the optimal beamforming vector J∗o by solving the following
optimization problem:
max
Jo
(
gTe Jo
)2
s.t. GTJo =
[
0 0
]
‖Jo‖ ≤ 1. (21)
To solve the above problem, we first introduce the following orthogonal projection notation
onto the null space of GT :
P⊥(G) , IK −G
(
GTG
)−1
GT , (22)
where IK denotes the K ×K identity matrix4. It is clear that any vector lying in the null space
of GT can be written as the multiplication of P⊥(G) by some vector uJ ∈ R
K . The optimal
J∗o vector then should be then of the form
J∗o = P
⊥(G)uJ , (23)
whence the objective function of problem (21) would be given by
(
gTe P
⊥(G)uJ
)2
, which is
maximized by choosing uJ = cJP⊥(G)ge, for some constant cJ ∈ R. Finally, to satisfy the
amplitude constraint, we choose the constant cJ such that
J∗o =
P⊥(G) ge
‖P⊥(G) ge‖1
. (24)
4Note that P⊥(·) can be defined to operate on vectors as well, denoting a projection onto their orthogonal complements in
the space.
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V. DECODE-AND-FORWARD
In this section, we discuss the decode-and-forward scheme. Communication occurs over two
phases. In the first phase, the source broadcasts its messages to both the legitimate users and
relays. In the second phase, the relays decode the received messages and forward them to the
users. The eavesdropper overhears the transmission over the two phases.
The received signal at the relays in the first phase is
yr = hrx+ nr, (25)
where nr ∼ N (0, IK) represents the Gaussian noise in the source-relays channels. In the second
phase, the ith relay decodes its received signal to find x1 and x2, re-encodes x1 into x˜1 and x2
into x˜2 using independent codewords, and then forwards them to the users using superposition
coding after multiplying its transmitted signal by a constant di ∈ R to be designed. Effectively,
the relays’ transmitted signal in the second phase is given by dxr, with d = [d1, d2, . . . , dK ],
and xr given by
xr = αx˜1 + (1− α)x˜2. (26)
That is, we assume the relays use the same α fraction as the source. The following constraints
hold at the relays:
α|x˜1|+ (1− α)|x˜2| ≤A¯ a.s., (27)
‖d‖1 ≤1. (28)
The received signals at the legitimate users and the eavesdropper in the second phase are given
by
yr1 =g
T
1 dxr + n
r
1, (29)
yr2 =g
T
2 dxr + n
r
2, (30)
yre =g
T
e dxr + n
r
e, (31)
where the superscript r is to denote signals received from the relays, and the noise terms nr1,
nr2, and n
r
e are i.i.d. ∼ N (0, 1).
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rDF1 =min
{
1
2
log
(
1+
2h21α
2A2γ
πe
)
+
1
2
log
(
1+
2
(
gT1 do
)2
α2A¯2
πe
)
,
1
2
log
(
1+ min
1≤i≤K
2h2r,iα
2A2γ
πe
)}
(35)
rDF2 =min

12 log
(
1 +
2h2
2
A2γ
pie
1 +
h2
2
α2A2γ
3
)
+
1
2
log

 1 + 2(gT2 do)
2
A¯2
pie
1 +
(gT2 do)
2
α2A¯2
3

 , 1
2
log

 min
1≤i≤K
1 +
2h2r,iA
2
γ
pie
1 +
h2r,iα
2A2γ
3




(36)
For the number of relays K ≥ 2, we propose designing the beamforming vector d to satisfy
gTe d = 0 (32)
so that the eavesdropper does not receive any useful information in the second phase. We denote
such beamforming signal by do. If K ≥ 3, then it will hold that both gT1 do and g
T
2 do are
non-zero a.s. We now have the following theorem, whose proof is in Appendix C:
Theorem 3 The following secrecy rate pair, for the strong and weak users, is achievable via
decode-and-forward for a given α:
rDF1,s =
1
2
[
rDF1 −
1
2
log
(
1 +
h2eα
2A2γ
3
)]+
, (33)
rDF2,s =
1
2
[
rDF2 −
1
2
log
(
1 +
h2eA
2
γ
3
1 +
2h2eα
2A2γ
pie
)]+
, (34)
where the superscript DF is to denote the decode-and-forward scheme, and rDF1 and r
DF
2 given
by (35) and (36), respectively, at the top of this page.
In view of (35) and (36), we see that rDF1 is increasing in
(
gT1 do
)2
, while direct first derivative
analysis shows that rDF2 is increasing in
(
gT1 do
)2
iff α ≤
√
2/pie
1/3
≈ 0.838, yet this condition can
be ignored since rDFs,2 can only be positive if α ≤ 0.838. Therefore, we propose the following
optimization problem to find the best beamforming vector:
max
do
α
(
gT1 do
)2
+ (1− α)
(
gT2 do
)2
s.t. gTe do = 0
‖d‖1 ≤ 1. (37)
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To satisfy the first constraint, the optimal d∗o should be of the form
d∗o = P
⊥(ge)ud , Fdud (38)
for some vector ud ∈ RK to be designed, with P⊥(·) as defined in (22). To choose the best ud,
we rewrite the objective function of the above problem slightly differently as follows:
uTdFd
(
αg1g
T
1 + (1− α)g2g
T
2
)
Fdud. (39)
Therefore, the optimal ud is given by
ud = cdvd, (40)
where cd ∈ R is a constant, and vd is the leading eigenvector of the matrix
Fd
(
αg1g
T
1 + (1− α)g2g
T
2
)
Fd, (41)
i.e., the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the matrix. Finally, we choose cd
to satisfy the amplitude constraint as follows:
ud =
vd
‖vd‖1
. (42)
VI. AMPLIFY-AND-FORWARD
In this section, we discuss the amplify-and-forward scheme. As in the decode-and-forward
scheme, communication occurs over two phases. However, in the second phase, the ith relay
merely re-sends its received signal from the first phase after multiplying (amplifying) it by a
constant ai ∈ R to be designed. Effectively, the relays’ transmitted signal in the second phase is
given by diag (yr)a, where diag(l) is the diagonalization of the vector l, and the following
amplitude constraint holds at the relays:
‖diag (yr)a‖1 ≤ A¯ a.s. (43)
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The received signals at the legitimate users and the eavesdropper in the second phase are given
by
yr1 =g
T
1 diag (yr)a + n
r
1, (44)
yr2 =g
T
2 diag (yr)a + n
r
2, (45)
yre =g
T
e diag (yr)a + n
r
e. (46)
As in the decode-and-forward scheme, for K ≥ 2 relays, we propose designing the beam-
forming vector a to satisfy
gTe diag (hr)a = 0 (47)
so that the eavesdropper does not receive any useful information in the second phase. We denote
such beamforming signal by ao. Further, for K ≥ 3 relays, it holds that both g
T
1 diag (hr)ao
and gT2 diag (hr)ao are non-zero a.s. We now have the following theorem, whose proof is in
Appendix D:
Theorem 4 The following secrecy rate pair, for the strong and weak users, is achievable via
amplify-and-forward for a given α:
rAF1,s =
1
2
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
2κ21α
2A2γ
πe
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
h2eα
2A2γ
3
)]+
, (48)
rAF2,s =
1
2
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
2κ2
2
A2γ
pie
1 +
κ2
2
α2A2γ
3
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
h2eA
2
γ
3
1 +
2h2eα
2A2γ
pie
)]+
, (49)
where the superscript AF is to denote the amplify-and-froward scheme, and
κ2j , h
2
j +
(
gTj diag (hr)ao
)2
1 +
(
gTj ao
)2 , j = 1, 2. (50)
In view of (48) and (49), we see that rAF1,s is increasing in κ
2
1, while direct first derivative shows
that rAF2,s is increasing in κ
2
2 iff α ≤
√
2/pie
1/3
≈ 0.838, yet again this condition can be ignored (as
we did in the decode-and-forward case) since rAF2,s can only be positive if α ≤ 0.838. Therefore,
we propose the following fractional optimization problem to find the best beamforming vector
15
that maximizes the jth user’s rate, j = 1, 2:
max
ao
(
gTj diag (hr)ao
)2
1 +
(
gTj ao
)2
s.t. gTe diag (hr)ao = 0
‖diag (yr)ao‖1 ≤ A¯. (51)
To solve the above fractional program, we introduce the following auxiliary problem:
pAFj (λ) , max
ao
(
gTj diag (hr)ao
)2
− λ
(
1 +
(
gTj ao
)2)
s.t. gTe diag (hr)ao = 0
‖diag (yr)ao‖1 ≤ A¯ (52)
for some λ ≥ 0. One can show the following: 1) pAFj (λ) is decreasing in λ; and 2) the optimal
solution of problem (51) is given by λ∗ that solves pAFj (λ
∗) = 0 [35]. Hence, one can find an
upper bound on λ∗ that makes pAFj (λ) < 0 and then proceed by, e.g., a bisection search, to find
λ∗. Focusing on problem (52), we first note that, to satisfy the first constraint, the optimal ao
should be of the form
ao = P
⊥(diag (hr) ge)ua , Faua (53)
for some vector ua ∈ RK to be designed. To choose the best ua, we rewrite the objective
function as
uTaFa
(
diag (hr)gjg
T
j diag (hr)− λgjg
T
j
)
Faua. (54)
Hence, the optimal ua is given by
ua = cava, (55)
where ca ∈ R is a constant, and va is the leading eigenvector of the matrix
Fa
(
diag (hr) gjg
T
j diag (hr)− λgjg
T
j
)
Fa. (56)
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We choose ca to satisfy the amplitude constraint as follows:
ua =
va
‖diag (yr)va|‖1
A¯. (57)
Finally, let a
(j)
o be the solution of problem (51). We propose using the following beamforming
vector:
a∗o = αa
(1)
o + (1− α)a
(2)
o . (58)
VII. NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we validate our results via numerical evaluations and discuss the relative per-
formances of the proposed schemes in this paper. We characterize the boundary of the achievable
secrecy regions of the different schemes by solving the following optimization problem for a
given µ ∈ [0, 1]:
max
α,γ
µrω1,s + (1− µ)r
ω
2,s
s.t. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, (59)
with ω ∈ {J,DF,AF} denoting the relaying scheme, or is simply not used in the case of direct
transmission. We solve the above problem numerically using, e.g., a line search algorithm. Since
the feasible set is bounded, this facilitates convergence to an optimal solution. For simplicity,
we set λ = 1 in the AF beamforming vector optimization and do not further optimize it.
We consider a room of size 5×5×3 cubic meters. With the origin tuple (0, 0, 0) denoting the
center of the room’s floor. The source is located at (0, 0, 3), the strong user at (0.75, 0.75, 0.7),
and the weak user at (−1.25, 0.75, 0.7). We consider K = 5 relays located at the following
positions: (0.1, 0.1, 2), (0.1,−0.1, 2), (0, 0, 2), (−0.1, 0.1, 2), and (−0.1,−0.1, 2), see the plan
view in Fig. 3. The channel gain between two nodes is given by (3), with Adet = 10
−4 and
φ 1
2
= 60◦. We set the amplitude constraint (or the system’s peak power budget) to A = 107.
In Fig. 4, the achievable secrecy rate regions of the schemes proposed in this paper, along
with that of the direct transmission scheme are shown. The solid lines in Fig. 4 are when the
eavesdropper is located at (0, 1.5, 0.7). We see in this case that all the proposed schemes perform
strictly better than direct transmission. The dashed lines in Fig. 4 are when the eavesdropper
17
0.1
0.751.25
strong userweak user
eavesdropper
relays
source
0.75
0.1
Fig. 3. Plan view of the geometric layout of the source, the relays, the legitimate users, and the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 4. Achievable secrecy regions of the proposed schemes. Solid lines are with eavesdropper at (0, 1.5, 0.7), and dashed
lines are with it at (0, 2, 0.7).
is located a bit further away from the source (and the relays) at (0, 2, 0.7). We see in this
case that larger secrecy rates are achievable for all schemes, and that direct transmission is
now comparable to cooperative jamming. We also note that they are both performing closer in
this case to decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward. The main reason behind this is that
as the eavesdropper gets further away from the source, the rate of increase in the achievable
secrecy rates in case of direct transmission and cooperative jamming becomes larger than that
of decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward. This is attributed to the pre-log 1
2
terms in the
case of decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward that are due to the half-duplex operation
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Fig. 5. Effect of eavesdropper’s distance from the source on the achievable secrecy sum rate. Only the second coordinate of
the eavesdropper’s location is varied, while the first and the third coordinates are fixed at 0 and 0.7, respectively.
of the relays. These terms have a diminishing effect on the achievable secrecy rates that becomes
more apparent as the eavesdropper gets further away, whence direct transmission and cooperative
jamming start performing better.
In Fig. 5, we investigate this latter note further, and show the effect of the eavesdropper’s
distance from the source on the secrecy sum rate, setting µ = 1
2
in problem (59). We vary the
eavesdropper’s location from (0, 0.75, 0.7) to (0, 4, 0.7), i.e., we only change its location’s second
coordinate’s value. We observe from the figure that clearly the secrecy sum rate increases, for all
schemes, as the eavesdropper’s distance from the source increases. We also note that at relatively
close locations, the proposed relaying schemes achieve strictly positive rates, as opposed to the
zero rate achieved via direct transmission. This shows how useful the proposed relaying schemes
become, compared to direct transmission, when the eavesdropper is relatively close to the source.
Finally, it can be seen from the figure that there exists a certain distance after which direct
transmission and cooperative jamming beat decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward. This
is attributed to, as discussed before, the diminishing effects of the pre-log 1
2
terms in the case of
decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward, which are not present in direct transmission and
cooperative jamming.
In Fig. 6, we show the effect of the SNR at the strong user on the achievable secrecy sum rates.
The strong user’s SNR (in dB) is given by 20 log10 (h1A). We consider a setting in which the
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Fig. 6. Effect of the strong user’s SNR on the achievable secrecy sum rate. Solid lines are with the eavesdropper at (0, 0.75, 0.7),
and dashed lines are with it at (0, 4.25, 0.7).
eavesdropper is close-by at (0, 0.75, 0.7), whose results are depicted in solid lines, and another
setting in which the eavesdropper is far-away at (0, 4.25, 0.7), whose results are depicted in
dashed lines. In the close-by setting, direct transmission achieves zero rate for all values of the
SNR, cooperative jamming starts achieving positive rates only for relatively higher values of the
SNR and continues to eventually beat all other schemes, amplify-and-forward performs best at
relatively lower SNR values and is beaten by decode-and-forward at relatively higher ones. In
the far-away setting, direct transmission and cooperative jamming are indistinguishable, and beat
decode-and-forward and amplify-and-forward for all values of the SNR. This is, once more, the
effect of the half-duplex operation of the relays. It is clear from Figs. 4, 5, and 6 that the best
relaying scheme depends on the secrecy rate region’s operating point, the distance between the
source and the eavesdropper and the SNR.
Next, we explore another aspect of relative distances between the nodes by fixing the eaves-
dropper’s location at (0, 1, 0.7) and varying the centroid of the relays’ positions. Specifically,
we let the relays be located at (0.1, cy + 0.1, 2), (0.1, cy − 0.1, 2), (0, cy, 2), (−0.1, cy + 0.1, 2),
and (−0.1, cy − 0.1, 2) and vary the center point cy from −0.5 to 1.5, see the plan view in
Fig. 7. We plot the achievable secrecy sum rates versus cy in Fig. 8. We see from the figure
that direct transmission achieves zero secrecy rates for all values of cy, since the eavesdropper
is relatively closer to the source than the legitimate users. On the other hand, all the proposed
20
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Fig. 7. Plan view of the geometric layout of the system, in which the center point of the relays’ positions is varying.
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Fig. 8. Effect of the relays’ distance from the eavesdropper on the secrecy sum rate. The eavesdropper is located at (0, 1, 0.7),
while the relays are located at (0.1, cy + 0.1, 2), (0.1, cy − 0.1, 2), (0, cy , 2), (−0.1, cy + 0.1, 2), and (−0.1, cy − 0.1, 2).
relaying schemes achieve strictly positive secrecy rates, with varying performances. We notice,
in particular, that the relatively simple cooperative jamming scheme performs best when the
relays are closest to the eavesdropper.
Finally, we explore the effect of a different aspect on the secrecy sum rate: the number of
relay nodes, and how far apart they are from each other. We consider the situation in which
the eavesdropper is located relatively close to the source at (0, 1.25, 0.7), and place a varying
number of relays along the corners and sides of a square of side length 2ℓ meters, centered
at (0, 0, 2). Specifically, we locate one relay at the center of the square, at (0, 0, 2), and the
remaining relays at either the corners: (ℓ, ℓ, 2), (−ℓ, ℓ, 2), (ℓ,−ℓ, 2), and (−ℓ,−ℓ, 2); or at the
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Fig. 9. Plan view of the geometric layout of the system, in which the number of relays is varying, as well as their relative
distance from each other. Either the layout in green with ℓ = 0.1, or that in brown with ℓ = 0.5 is chosen to employ the varying
number of relays.
centers of the sides: (ℓ, 0, 2), (0, ℓ, 2), (−ℓ, 0, 2), and (0,−ℓ, 2), see the plan view in Fig. 9. We
vary the number of relays, K, from 3 to 9 relays, and plot the achievable secrecy sum rate for
each case in Fig. 10. The solid lines in the figure are when ℓ = 0.1 meters, while the dashed
lines are when ℓ = 0.5 meters. We see from the figure that direct transmission achieves zero
secrecy rates, since the eavesdropper is relatively closer to the source than the legitimate users,
while all the proposed schemes achieve strictly positive secrecy sum rates. The main message
conveyed by this figure, however, is that for every relaying scheme, there exists an optimal
number of relays that maximizes the secrecy sum rate. Such optimal number is not necessarily
the maximum number of relays available (9 in this case). The reason behind this is that when
new relay LEDs are added to the system, the power share per-relay decreases. This might
hurt the overall performance if, for instance, this newly added relay is not very well-positioned
with respect to the eavesdropper, relative to the already existing ones, and ends up consuming
power unnecessarily. Another observation from Fig. 10 is that the relative distance between the
relays is an important system aspect that should be carefully designed to meet a desired system
performance.
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Fig. 10. Effect of number of relays on the secrecy sum rates of the proposed schemes. The eavesdropper is located at
(0, 1.25, 0.7). The relays are located along the corner and mid-side points of a square of side length 2ℓ meters, centered at
(0, 0, 2). Solid lines are when ℓ = 0.1, and dashed lines are when ℓ = 0.5.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A VLC broadcast channel in which a transmitter communicates with two legitimate receivers
in the presence of an external eavesdropper has been considered. Under an amplitude constraint,
imposed to allow the LEDs to operate within their dynamic range, an achievable secrecy rate
region has been derived, based on superposition coding with uniform signaling. Then, trusted
cooperative half-duplex relay nodes have been introduced in order to assist with securing the
data from the eavesdropper via multiple relaying schemes: cooperative jamming, decode-and-
forward, and amplify-and-forward. Secure beamforming signals have been carefully designed
at the relays to enhance the achievable secrecy rates. It has been shown that the best relaying
scheme varies according to the distance from the transmitter (and the relays) to the eavesdropper,
and also on the number of relays and their geometric layout.
Extending the approaches in this paper to the case with multiple transmitting LED fixtures
and/or multiple receiving PDs would be of interest as a future direction. In addition, one could
also consider deriving achievable secrecy rate regions based on different distributions other
than uniform, such as discrete and truncated generalized normal distributions, that have been
previously used in the literature. Another direction would be to consider the case in which the
eavesdropper’s location is not known at the transmitter, or known within some boundaries. In
the former case, the goal would be deriving secrecy outage probabilities, while in the latter case,
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the goal could be deriving a worst case achievable secrecy rate region.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Given α, the following secrecy rates, for the strong and weak users, are achievable for this
multi-receiver wiretap channel [36]:
c1,s = [I(x; y1|x2)− I(x; ye|x2)]
+ , (60)
c2,s = [I(x2; y2)− I(x2; ye)]
+ , (61)
where I(·; ·) denotes the mutual information measure [33]. Now let the transmitted symbols x1
and x2 represent two independent uniformly distributed random variables on [−A,A]. Clearly,
this satisfies the amplitude constraint in (2). Let us now drop the superscript + for simplicity of
presentation. We proceed by lower bounding c1,s as follows:
c1,s =I (x; h1(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + n1|x2)− I (x; he(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + ne|x2) (62)
=I (x1; h1αx1 + n1)− I (x1; heαx1 + ne) (63)
=h (h1αx1 + n1)− h (heαx1 + ne) (64)
≥
1
2
log
(
e2h(h1αx1) + e2h(n1)
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2eα
2A
2
3
+ 1
))
(65)
=
1
2
log
(
h21α
24A2 + 2πe
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2eα
2A
2
3
+ 1
))
(66)
=r1,s, (67)
where h(·) in (64) denotes the differential entropy measure [33], and (65) follows by lower
bounding the first (positive) term in (64) by the entropy power inequality (EPI) [33] and upper
bounding the second (negative) term in (64) by plugging in a Gaussian x1, instead of uniform,
with the same variance, since Gaussian maximizes differential entropy [33]. Next, we proceed
similarly to lower bound c2,s as follows:
c2,s =I (x2; h2(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + n2)− I (x2; he(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + ne) (68)
=h (h2(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + n2)− h (h2αx1 + n2)
− h (he(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + ne) + h (heαx1 + ne) (69)
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≥αh (h2x1 + n2) + (1− α)h (h2x2 + n2)− h (h2αx1 + n2)
− h (he(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + ne) + h (heαx1 + ne) (70)
≥
1
2
log
(
e2h(h2x1) + e2h(n2)
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h22α
2A
2
3
+ 1
))
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2eα
2A
2
3
+ h2e(1− α)
2A
2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
(
e2h(heαx1) + e2h(ne)
)
(71)
≥
1
2
log
(
e2h(h2x1) + e2h(n2)
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h22α
2A
2
3
+ 1
))
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2e
A2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
(
e2h(heαx1) + e2h(ne)
)
(72)
=
1
2
log
(
h224A
2 + 2πe
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h22α
2A
2
3
+ 1
))
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2e
A2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
(
h22α
24A2 + 2πe
)
(73)
=r2,s, (74)
where (70) follows by Jensen’s inequality (concavity of differential entropy) [33]; (71) follows
by using EPI to lower bound the positive terms of (70) together with the fact that h2x1 + n2
and h2x2 + n2 have the same distribution, and plugging in a Gaussian x1 and x2, instead of
uniform, with the same variances to upper bound the negative terms of (70); and (72) follows
since α ≤ 1. This concludes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We first note that, different from direct transmission, over here we have another random
variable z involved in the calculations. To emphasize the difference, we denote the secrecy rates
in (60) and (61) by cJ1,s and c
J
2,s, respectively. We now proceed with the same approach as
that followed in the proof of Theorem 1. Specifically, we let x1 and x2 be two independent
uniformly distributed random variables on [−Aγ , Aγ], and let z be uniformly distributed on[
−A¯, A¯
]
, independently of x1 and x2. We then expand the mutual information terms constituting
cJ1,s and c
J
2,s in terms of differential entropy, lower bound positive terms by EPI (and Jensen’s
inequality if need be), and upper bound negative terms by plugging in Gaussian random variables
with the same variances, instead of uniform. Specific justifications of intermediate steps are as
in the proof of Theorem 1 and are thus omitted for brevity. We also drop the superscript + for
convenience.
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A lower bound on cJ1,s is now given by
cJ1,s =I (x1; h1αx1 + n1)− I
(
x1; heαx1 + g
T
e Joz + ne
)
(75)
=h (h1αx1 + n1)− h (n1)− h
(
heαx1 + g
T
e Joz + ne
)
+ h
(
gTe Joz + ne
)
(76)
≥
1
2
log
(
e2h(h1αx1) + e2h(n1)
)
−
1
2
log(2πe)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2eα
2
A2γ
3
+
(
gTe Jo
)2 A¯2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
(
e2h(g
T
e Joz) + e2h(ne)
)
(77)
=
1
2
log
(
h21α
24A2γ + 2πe
)
−
1
2
log(2πe)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2eα
2
A2γ
3
+
(
gTe Jo
)2 A¯2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
((
gTe Jo
)2
α24A¯2 + 2πe
)
(78)
=rJ1,s. (79)
Similarly, we lower bound cJ2,s as follows:
cJ2,s =I (x2; h2(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + n2)− I
(
x2; he(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + g
T
e Joz + ne
)
(80)
=h (h2(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + n2)− h (h2αx1 + n2)
− h
(
he(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + g
T
e Joz + ne
)
+ h
(
heαx1 + g
T
e Joz + ne
)
(81)
≥αh (h2x1 + n2) + (1− α)h (h2x2 + n2)− h (h2αx1 + n2)
− h
(
he(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + g
T
e Joz + ne
)
+ h
(
heαx1 + g
T
e Joz + ne
)
(82)
≥
1
2
log
(
e2h(h2x1) + e2h(n2)
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h22α
2
A2γ
3
+ 1
))
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2eα
2
A2γ
3
+ h2e(1− α)
2
A2γ
3
+
(
gTe Jo
)2 A¯2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
(
e2h(heαx1) + e2h(g
T
e Joz) + e2h(ne)
)
(83)
≥
1
2
log
(
e2h(h2x1) + e2h(n2)
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h22α
2
A2γ
3
+ 1
))
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2e
A2γ
3
+
(
gTe Jo
)2 A¯2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
(
e2h(heαx1) + e2h(g
T
e Joz) + e2h(ne)
)
(84)
=
1
2
log
(
h224A
2
γ + 2πe
)
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h22α
2
A2γ
3
+ 1
))
−
1
2
log
(
2πe
(
h2e
A2γ
3
+
(
gTe Jo
)2 A¯2
3
+ 1
))
+
1
2
log
(
h22α
24A2γ +
(
gTe Jo
)2
α24A¯2 + 2πe
)
(85)
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=rJ2,s. (86)
This concludes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We let the relays employ the same decoding technique of the strong user: first decode the weak
user’s message by treating the strong user’s interfering signal as noise, and then use successive
interference cancellation to decode the strong user’s message. Using the decode-and-froward
lower bound in [37, Theorem 16.2], the following secrecy rates are achievable:
cDF1,s =
1
2
[
min
{
I (x, xr; y1, y
r
1|x2, x˜2) ,min
i
I (x1; yr,i|x2)
}
− I(x; ye|x2)
]+
, (87)
cDF2,s =
1
2
[
min
{
I (x2, x˜2; y2, y
r
2) ,min
i
I (x2; yr,i)
}
− I(x2; ye)
]+
, (88)
where the extra 1
2
term is due to sending the same information over two phases of equal durations.
By the independence of xj and x˜j , j = 1, 2, we have
I (x1, x˜1; y1, y
r
1|x2, x˜2) = I (x1; h1αx1 + n1) + I
(
x˜1; g
T
1 doαx˜1 + n
r
1
)
, (89)
I (x2, x˜2; y2, y
r
2) = I (x2; h2α(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + n2) + I
(
x˜2; g
T
2 do(αx˜1 + (1− α)x˜2) + n
r
2
)
.
(90)
To derive the lower bounds on cDF1,s and c
DF
2,s , we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1 by
lower bounding the positive terms above by EPI (and Jensen’s inequality if need be), and upper
bounding the negative terms above by plugging in Gaussian random variables with the same
variances instead of uniform. This directly gives rDF1,s and r
DF
2,s . Specific details are merely the
same as in the proof of Theorem 1 and are omitted for brevity.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We note that the jth user, j = 1, 2, can view the system as the following 1×2 SIMO system:
yj
yrj

 =

 hj
gTj diag (hr)ao

 x+

nj
n˜rj

 , (91)
where the noise term n˜rj , g
T
j diag (nr)ao+n
r
j , which is ∼ N
(
0, 1 +
(
gTj ao
)2)
. The jth user
then applies the capacity achieving maximal ratio combining [38] to get the following sufficient
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statistic:
y˜j ,hjyj +
gTj diag (hr)ao
1 +
(
gTj ao
)2 yrj (92)
,hjyj +
hj,r
σ2j,r
yrj . (93)
Therefore, the following secrecy rates are now achievable:
cAF1,s =
1
2
[I (x; y˜1|x2)− I(x; ye|x2)]
+ , (94)
cAF2,s =
1
2
[I (x2; y˜2)− I(x2; ye)]
+ , (95)
where the extra 1
2
term is due to sending the same information over two phases of equal durations,
as in the decode-and-forward scheme. We now proceed with lower bounding the positive mutual
information terms in (94) and (95); the negative terms are handled exactly as in the proof of
Theorem 1. For the strong user, we have
I (x; y˜1|x2) = h
((
h21 +
h21,r
σ21,r
)
αx1 + h1n1 +
h1,r
σ21,r
n˜r1
)
− h
(
h1n1 +
h1,r
σ21,r
n˜r1
)
(96)
≥
1
2
log
(
e
2h
((
h2
1
+
h2
1,r
σ2
1,r
)
αx1
)
+ e2h(h1n1) + e
2h
(
h1,r
σ2
1,r
n˜r
1
))
−
1
2
log
(
(2πe)
(
h21 +
h21,r
σ21,r
))
(97)
=
1
2
log
((
h21 +
h21,r
σ21,r
)2
α24A2γ + (2πe)
(
h21 +
h21,r
σ21,r
))
−
1
2
log
(
(2πe)
(
h21 +
h21,r
σ21,r
))
(98)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
2κ21α
2A2γ
πe
)
. (99)
Similarly, for the weak user, we have
I (x2; y˜2) = h
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)
(αx1 + (1− α)x2) + h2n2 +
h2,r
σ22,r
n˜r2
)
− h
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)
αx1 + h2n2 +
h2,r
σ22,r
n˜r2
)
(100)
≥ αh
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)
x1 + h2n2 +
h2,r
σ22,r
n˜r2
)
+(1−α)h
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)
x2 + h2n2 +
h2,r
σ22,r
n˜r2
)
−
1
2
log
(
(2πe)
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)2
A2γ
3
+ h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
))
(101)
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≥
1
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((
h2
2
+
h2
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σ2
2,r
)
x1
)
+ e2h(h2n2) + e
2h
(
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n˜r
2
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−
1
2
log
(
(2πe)
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)2
A2γ
3
+ h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
))
(102)
=
1
2
log
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)2
4A2γ + (2πe)
(
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
))
−
1
2
log
(
(2πe)
((
h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
)2
A2γ
3
+ h22 +
h22,r
σ22,r
))
(103)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
2κ2
2
A2γ
pie
1 +
κ2
2
α2A2γ
3
)
. (104)
This concludes the proof.
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